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Abstract 
When should we ever expect to see durable moves toward greater wage bargaining coordination? Moving 
to sustained coordinated wage bargaining presupposes that unions and employers can both be convinced 
that wage bargaining is in fact a game in which both actors prefer coordination.  This can only happen 
when these social actors come to accept as true an idea of the economy in which their coordination through 
wage bargaining institutions will give them better outcomes than would bargaining through decentralized 
institutions. This paper argues that the process of developing common knowledge changes institutional 
preferences among employers. It was the development of common knowledge that changed employer pref-
erences about the attractiveness of institutions for wage coordination in Ireland in Italy. In both cases, the 
development of common expectations required the emergence and joint ratification of a common set of ref-
erences, in what I call common knowledge events. These events led organized employers to change their 
previous position about acceptable institutions of wage bargaining. This change made possible the institu-
tionalization of coordinated wage bargaining in both countries. As demonstrated through counterfactual 
analysis of the Australian case, the emergence and ratification of such a common view is the necessary con-
dition for the emergence and survival of coordinated wage bargaining institutions. 
 2 
 
Introduction  
 
  In a period of internationally liberalizing markets, the last thing political scien-
tists expect to observe is a move to more coordinated wage bargaining. Changes in pro-
duction technology and shifting distributional coalitions have led to moves to less coor-
dinated bargaining in many of the Scandinavian countries (Pontusson and Swenson 
2000, Iversen 1996) and have put significant pressure on coordinated bargaining institu-
tions in Germany and elsewhere (Thelen 2001). We can see why changing material situa-
tions lead to changes in institutional preferences that allow new interest coalitions to 
break out of coordinated systems. Given an opportunity to move closer to an institution-
al solution that promises improved returns, actors with sufficient political power re-
sources can, unilaterally, stop participating in coordinated institutions. Yet under what 
conditions should we ever expect to see durable moves toward greater wage bargaining 
coordination, as happened in Ireland in 1987 and Italy in 1993? 
 
  Moving countries to sustained and coordinated wage bargaining presupposes 
that unions and employers can both be convinced that wage bargaining—a classic zero-
sum game, where my loss is your gain and vice versa—is in fact a game in which both 
actors will prefer coordination.1  This can only happen when these social actors come to 
accept as true an idea of the economy in which their coordination through wage bar-
gaining institutions will give them better outcomes over time than would bargaining 
through decentralized institutions. Rationalists refer to shared mental models as com-
mon knowledge, but I will argue in this paper that the process of developing common 
knowledge changes institutional preferences among employers. It was the development 
of common knowledge that changed employer preferences about the attractiveness of 
institutions for wage coordination in Ireland in Italy. In both cases, I will show that the 
development of common expectations required the emergence and joint ratification of a 
common set of references, which—by virtue of their joint ratification as the way the 
world works—become unavoidable for the social actors involved. Once these ideas 
become established as common knowledge, institutional solutions not based on them 
become far less likely to succeed, even when some of these actors had previously enun-
ciated a different set of institutional preference orderings. Where such a common view 
fails to emerge, or unravels—as in the case of Australia in the early 1990s—it becomes 
impossible to sustain coordinated wage bargaining institutions.  
 
  The first section of the paper examines the interaction of coordinating ideas, com-
mon knowledge, and institutional change. The next three sections examine two cases of 
successful moves toward more coordinated wage bargaining institutions—Ireland and 
Italy—as well as the breakdown of coordination in Australia. The final section con-
cludes. 
 
 
The Process of Institutional Change 
 
  Institutions only break down after a period during which “the taken-for-
grantedness of the old institution [is] called into question” (Aoki 2001: 241). The process 
                                                 
1 This formulation owes much to a comment by Peter Hall. 3 
of institutional change in such cases is tentative, marked by uncertainty over the dis-
tributive outcomes of any new institutional choice. In such a period of uncertainty, col-
lective actors look for cues from other actors for what they believe about the world. It is 
conventional in much social scientific analysis to ascribe to the interaction of the actors 
some set of interests and payoffs. While this analytical technique is highly productive for 
characterizing interactions during periods of institutional stasis, it obscures a highly sig-
nificant dynamic of processes of institutional change: what sort of game do the actors 
perceive themselves as playing? In particular, do they see gains from coordination, and 
does each see that the other sees this (i.e., do they share common knowledge of the 
game)?  
 
   In the interactions between unions and employers examined here, the crucial 
question of common knowledge can be framed thus: How do employers think that 
unions will act under coordinated bargaining institutions? Will industry-coordinated 
agreements serve to ensure wage moderation by limiting plant-level wage push, or will 
they instead serve as a floor against which plant-level organizations will push for signifi-
cant increases? This was the question faced by employers in Ireland, Italy, and Australia 
as they considered changes to their existing institutional structures. In each case, past ex-
periments with coordinated bargaining had generated the latter response from unions, 
and had thus led to inflationary outcomes. As existing institutions lost the characteristic 
of “taken-for-grantedness” described by Aoki, the way employers in these countries 
thought about alternative arrangements hinged on how they thought unions would re-
spond under coordinated institutions. In turn, that depended on how they thought 
unions viewed the functioning of the economy. 
 
  This was not a problem of credible commitments, but of common knowledge. 
The functioning of coordinated institutions depends on a high degree of common 
knowledge among organized actors (Hall and Soskice 2001: 63). They must have shared 
expectations: congruent (though not identical) models of how the economy works and 
how wage increases relate to unemployment. They can then bargain over the increase 
that is consistent with their desired employment effects. Yet in all three countries under 
examination, unions and employers had in the past professed different models of the 
economy. In order to move to stably coordinated institutions of wage bargaining, unions 
and employers had to agree on a framework of analysis. In the period when an existing 
institution enters into crisis, we do not expect there to be widespread agreement among 
competing actors about the shape of new institutions. That agreement is crafted over 
time by the results of conversations and shared experiences between those competing 
actors. Institutional change in the direction of increased coordination requires employers 
and unions to come to a shared diagnosis of a problem and agreement about some of the 
features of the solution to that problem. 
 
  Employers and unions may experience similar “objective” conditions, but they 
may draw different conclusions from them. The process of constructing joint under-
standings is contingent—in a structurally similar situation, it may fail in one place and 
succeed in another. During a period of uncertainty and declining confidence in existing 
institutions—brought about, e.g., by declining performance of those institutions—social 
actors will put forward institutional proposals they regard as most beneficial to them-
selves. Yet they will be in some real sense uncertain what the most beneficial future ar-4 
rangements are, both because they are uncertain about the state of the world and be-
cause they are uncertain about how their negotiating partner will behave under a new 
institutional arrangement.2 Thus, during this period of institutional transition, they are 
not only bargaining; they are trying to convince each other about the viability of a cer-
tain view of the world. As anyone knows who has lost an argument with young chil-
dren, the outcome of such discussions is not always the preferred result of the most 
powerful actor. In the process of argument, the obviousness that some ideas acquire 
over time makes it increasingly difficult to accept solutions not based on these ideas.3 
 
  The force of these coordinating ideas, though, is their jointness—that is, the fact 
that competing actors share them. How do such ideas become shared? The marker of 
success, I will argue, is an event that crystallizes common understandings in a public 
and recognizable way (cf. Sewell 1999). In the industrial relations cases considered here, 
these events are usually agreements signed by unions and employers (which precede the 
establishment of new institutions).4 Once these common understandings are publicly 
agreed and ratified by competing actors, they set the future terms of debate among 
social actors by limning the features of the gains from trade. Once they have agreed on a 
common view of the world in which they can potentially gain from coordination, neither 
a strong social actor nor public policy is likely to be able to enact new institutional solu-
tions by legislative or judicial fiat. The social actors have agreed on the game they are 
playing, and the possibility for gains from coordination, and public policy cannot easily 
push them to a different solution. Policymakers can influence the process of institutional 
change only insofar as they clarify or make credible the newly emerging shared beliefs 
of how the world works (Aoki 2002: 236). Empirically, we therefore expect the role of the 
state to be in exhorting the actors to talk to each other and to clarify joint understand-
ings, not to legislate new institutional solutions. 
 
  Once such an event has taken place, though, previously firm institutional pref-
erences become flexible. These events, by ratifying common knowledge, change prior 
employer expectations of how unions will act. The events become constraining, in this 
sense: institutions that flow from such joint understandings become more likely to be 
adopted, because they “make sense,” given how the relevant actors see the world. In this 
process, state policy cannot effect moves to higher coordination on its own, since these 
moves are dependent on the shared knowledge of social actors, for whom state policy is 
merely one input (Aoki 2002, Culpepper 2003). The claims made above depend on show-
ing that the emergence of common knowledge was contingent: it was not preordained 
                                                 
2 Cf. Blyth 2001. 
3 Rationalist theorists have used similar language to describe the concept of focal points—points 
that by their very obviousness become unavoidable points around which to coordinate (Schelling 
1960, Garrett and Weingast 1993). The concept of focal points assumes a prior agreement about 
the value of coordination, however: we want to do something together, and the focal point tells 
us the most likely place to do that. In an earlier draft of this paper I used the language of focal 
points to discuss points of constructed prominence. Yet the ideas discussed herein do not merely 
designate obvious points of agreement—the process of coming to those points of agreement helps 
make coordination preferable to non-coordination.  
4 Such “events” do not have to be signed agreements; in the highly contentious realm of contem-
porary industrial relations, though, they will almost always be such agreements. 5 
by objective interests of the concerned actors. Thus, actors in similar situations could, or 
could not, have reached a similar understanding. Reaching this common knowledge 
through a public event, however, is the prerequisite of moving to more highly coordi-
nated institutions. If it does not happen, social actors will not be able to move to higher 
levels of coordination.  
 
 
Industrial Relations and Case Selection 
 
  Comparing cases of institutional change and stability cross-nationally requires a 
set of comparable measures of institutional functioning. The literature on industrial rela-
tions institutions in political economy has produced a set of time-varying, well-defined 
and calibrated assessments of institutional functioning that allows for such a comparison 
(cf. Kenworthy 2001a for a discussion). Within this literature, the conceptual innovation 
associated with the work of David Soskice (1990), differentiating between centralization 
and coordination of wage bargaining, has been seminal. Coordination distinguishes be-
tween the existence of formally centralized bargaining arrangements, such as those in 
Austria, and agreements that are not formally centralized but are de facto highly coordi-
nated across sectors, such as those in Germany or Japan. Such coordination may produce 
similar effects on wage restraint as centralization, but without the presence of formally 
centralized wage bargaining arrangements. To examine the dynamics of common 
knowledge creation in processes of institutional change, we want to explore cases with 
similar institutional histories and employer preferences over institutions, including cases 
that moved toward or sustained coordination and those that did not move to or sustain 
coordination. 
 
  Using Lane Kenworthy’s (2001b) database of wage bargaining coordination, Ire-
land and Italy are the only countries that since 1985 have moved from low to high coor-
dination. During this same period, Australia is one of two countries (with Sweden) that 
moved from high coordination to low coordination.5 Unlike Sweden, which had stable 
bargaining arrangements for almost three decades prior to the changes of the early 
1980s, Australia, Ireland, and Italy all experimented with a variety of wage bargaining 
arrangements in the 1970s and 1980s, none of which had delivered sustained wage mod-
eration (Hardiman 1988; other cites). None of these countries was considered highly cor-
poratist, as unions and employer bargaining was characteristically conflictual and de-
centralized. Prior to their moments of institutional change—Ireland in 1987, Italy in 
1993, and Australia in 1991—it would not have been possible to predict their ultimate in-
stitutional solutions, based on the preferences of organized employers. Employers in 
Italy and in Australia were internally divided (Sheldon and Thornthwaite 1999); em-
ployers in Ireland were united, up to mid-1987, in the position that they did not want a 
return to centralized bargaining. Yet Ireland and Italy wound up moving to more coor-
dinated bargaining systems, and Australian bargaining decentralized. In the next three 
sections, we try to help answer the question: why? 
                                                 
5 I restrict this discussion to the years since 1985 so as to exclude the rash of imitative centralized 
incomes policies adopted by many OECD countries during the 1970s and early 1980s. These deals 
were often state-imposed, rather than emerging from interest-group agreement on new institu-
tions, and many proved highly unstable over time. 
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Ireland 
 
  The dramatic changes in Irish industrial relations institutions, and Irish social 
partnership more generally, have been studied by numerous political scientists (Sabel 
1996; Hardiman 2002; Ornston 2004). The moment of institutional change in industrial 
relations was the signing of the Program for National Recovery (PNR) in October 1987 by 
employers, unions, farming interests, and the state. One of the central planks of the 
agreement was the move from decentralized to centralized bargaining, including targets 
for wage growth from 1987 to 1990. Yet the agreement also included government com-
mitments on macroeconomic and social policy, and a joint commitment to membership 
of the narrow bands of the exchange rate mechanism (O’Donnell 1998: 11). As has been 
emphasized by both observers (Hardiman 2002) and participants (O’Donnell 1998), the 
framework for agreement on the various policy reforms was hammered out in negotia-
tions in the National Economic and Social Council, whose final report, “A Strategy for 
Development, 1986-90,” was released in November 1986. As summarized by Hardiman 
(2002: 8): “In this forum, employer and union leaders developed a shared analysis of the 
nature of the country’s economic problems and the priorities that needed to be ad-
dressed. [The Strategy for Development] accepted that moderation in pay increases 
would be essential to improve competitiveness and, thus, generate the necessary eco-
nomic improvement, though it did not explicitly advocate an incomes policy.” This 
foundational document, cited by all who write about it as the basis of shared under-
standings among union and employer representatives, did not advocate centralized 
wage bargaining institutions. Yet this was the major institutional innovation agreed to in 
the PNR in 1987. Why did Ireland make the institutional change from decentralized to 
highly centralized wage bargaining? 
 
 
Common Knowledge Formation and the NESC Paper 
 
  To be more exact, the puzzle here is why Irish employers agreed to adopt central-
ized bargaining. The Irish trade union confederation had come out in favor of central-
ized bargaining in July 1986—more than a year before employers acceded to the signing 
of the PNR that created centralized bargaining in Ireland (Irish Times 1986a). Ireland had 
previously experimented with centralized bargaining institutions in the late 1970s, 
which later collapsed when private sector employers withdrew from them in 1981 (Har-
diman 2002). Since that time, employers had remained steadfastly opposed to central-
ized bargaining (Roche 1994). The prevailing interpretation of the volte face of Irish em-
ployers over centralized bargaining is succinctly put by Baccaro (2002b: 8): “The employ-
ers had to be dragged into the deal, particularly by the staunch determination of the 
government to have an agreement” (cf. Hardiman 2002: 9-10). This explanation is, at 
best, incomplete. The government possessed no resources to force the employers to sign 
the agreement, other than the fact it had adopted policies (spending cuts) long favored 
by employers’ organizations (Business and Finance 1987a). Unions were, by all accounts, 
much weakened by continuing high unemployment (Hardiman 1988, MacSharry and 
White 2000). Reviewing employers’ own explanations of why their position changed, we 
see instead a set of arguments for why the collective bargaining arrangements would 
lead to a different set of outcomes than had the old, failed incomes policies. In other 7 
words, employers over the course of negotiations reevaluated their estimates of how 
well centralized bargaining would deliver wage restraint, given the newly expressed in-
formation about trade union preferences. The employers signed the agreement because 
they thought it was in their interest—even though they would not have thought the 
same thing three months earlier. Institutions of centralized bargaining became their pre-
ferred institutional solution for achieving wage restraint, and that was what compelled 
employers to adopt an institution they had previously opposed. 
 
  Irish employers had pulled out of centralized bargaining institutions in 1981 be-
cause of a divergence of views with union leaders about the causes of high unemploy-
ment: employers attributed unemployment to excessive wage agreements, unions to de-
ficient demand stimulus (Roche 1994: 170). Given this divergence, Irish employers had 
judged decentralized bargaining a better way to achieve wage restraint. Yet decentral-
ized bargaining had been only partially successful in this goal between 1981 and 1986. 
While the rates of both wage growth and strikes were reduced during this time, wage 
gains in Ireland continued to outpace inflation (Roche 1994: 178). Over the first half of 
the 1980s, Ireland moved from being a high inflation (20 percent in 1981) to a low infla-
tion (4 percent in 1986) economy. Organized employers in this disinflationary environ-
ment were highly interested in re-setting the wage expectations of workers across the 
economy, going so far as to take out several large advertisements in the Irish Times dur-
ing July 1986, that Ireland’s fitness for international competition depended on wage 
moderation, each declaring that “[M]oderate pay settlements will make jobs more 
secure.”6  
 
  It is at this juncture that the common diagnosis of the celebrated NESC report on 
Ireland’s economy became important. That report took as the heart of its analysis the 
fact that Ireland was a small, open economy whose employment prospects depended on 
the competitiveness of its tradeable sectors.  
 
What is crucial for the attainment of sustained economic growth in an 
economy such as Ireland’s is the capacity of the internationally trading 
sectors to produce goods and services and to sell them competitively on 
export markets…. In the short term this can be achieved by securing the 
maximum degree of cost-competitiveness and in the medium-term by de-
fending competitive advantage while at the same time expanding the pro-
ductive capacity of the economy  (NESC, A Strategy for Development, 1986-
1990, p. 148). 
 
  Drawing the incomes policy prescriptions of this analytical position, the report 
concluded that the result of the wage bargaining process “should be that the average 
rate of cost increase in Ireland not exceed the average of cost increases in our main trad-
ing partners” (NESC 1986: 185). The NESC report made no commitment to a particular set 
of wage bargaining institutions, but it publicly committed unions and employers to a 
common analysis of the problems the Irish economy was facing, linking unemployment 
to international competitiveness and wage moderation. Moreover, the report committed 
                                                 
6 Irish Times¸ July 4, 11, 18,  1986.  The peak federation of Irish Trade Unions explicitly rejected the 
suggested trade-off of the FUE campaign (Irish Times 1986b). 8 
unions and employers to a diagnosis that disavowed alternative views—formerly es-
poused by unions—of the sources of economic growth: “those sectors of the economy 
which exclusively or predominantly serve the domestic market, [which includes most of 
the public sector,] cannot be regarded as independent sources of sustained economic 
growth….. Secondly, domestic demand cannot be regarded as an independent source of 
sustainable growth” (NESC 1986: 147). 
 
 The  NESC report publicly committed both sides to an economic interpretation that 
linked the sources of GNP growth to wage restraint in general, and to public sector wage 
restraint in particular.  It represented a public disavowal by unions of their previously 
stated position that deficient demand was the cause of low growth and unemployment 
(Roche 1994: 170). The document was nothing more than a statement of common views, 
and it was a statement without the power to bind anyone. This statement, though, 
would ultimately contribute to having employers change their preferences over wage 
bargaining institutions. 
 
 
Employer Preferences and Institutional Change: the PNR 
 
  After the signing of the NESC agreement in 1986, Irish trade union leaders made 
repeated public statements to employers and the government that they were willing to 
make a multiyear commitment to wage moderation as part of a national tripartite agree-
ment covering social and economic policy reforms proposed in the NESC plan. In a 
speech at the end of 1986, covered widely in the Irish press (including by the employers’ 
federation’s own newsletter), the trade union leader Billy Attley specifically praised the 
consensual models of Austria, Sweden, and Norway in discussions of a future potential 
Irish pact (Hardiman 1988: 234). The employers repeatedly rejected these calls for a 
move to higher coordination. As late as June, 1987—eight months after the release of the 
NESC report—Irish organized employers reiterated their opposition to centralized bar-
gaining (ibid: 236-7). 
 
  Employers opposed a return to centralized bargaining because of the way that 
the institution had previously functioned. As summarized by two politicians involved in 
the negotiations, Ray MacSharry and Padraic White (2000: 126-7): “From the outset, the 
greatest obstacle was the skepticism of the employers, given their disillusion with as-
pects of centralized bargaining. In particular they were concerned that the pay terms 
would become a floor—from which unions would bargain for higher demands—rather 
than a ceiling that would limit pay demands to the strict terms of the agreement. In 
other words, they feared a return to past patterns of behavior where, too often, national 
wage accords had been loosely interpreted and wage inflation had eroded competitive-
ness.” Thus, organized employers insisted repeatedly on the formulation, which was in-
cluded in the text of the final Programme for National Recovery, that “no further cost-
increasing claims will be made on employers” (Irish Times 9 October 1987, p. 13). More-
over, they contested the flat minimum pay increases for the lowest paid workers, and 
this measure was not made binding on private sector firms. In the text of the agreement, 
these points underlined employers’ reinterpretations of what national bargaining in this 
context meant. 
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  Employers took as credible the statements of unions because the unions had, 
from the moment of signing the NESC document, publicly adopted what we might call a 
“Small States in World Markets” view of the economy (Katzenstein 1985). First, the 
union claim to pay restraint was credible, because union leaders were repeatedly dis-
tancing themselves from their old ways of bargaining with employers and the govern-
ment, and aligning themselves with the small states with low unemployment: 
 
We took the view that the most acceptable models on which to base a Pro-
gramme for National Recovery should be successful European countries 
such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. These coun-
tries have rejected the confrontationist approach of the New Right and 
have lower levels of unemployment than the United States or the United 
Kingdom. (IT 10/17/87, p.16). 
 
Such statements pledged unions to an approach to industrial relations, not merely to the 
terms of a given pay deal.  
 
  The fundamental claim being made here is that, in the absence of the agreed set 
of interpretations reached in the NESC report, employers would not have agreed to move 
toward coordinated bargaining institutions. This view is consistent with that expressed 
by leading scholars of the Irish political economy (Roche 1994, O’Donnell 199x, Hardi-
man 1988). “It would be misleading to suggest that a return to centralized negotiation 
linking pay with other policy objectives was in any sense inevitable…. [T]he possibility 
of negotiating a new centralized pay agreement had emerged from discussions publicly 
conducted in the mid-1980s over how best to plan for medium-term economic recovery” 
(Hardiman 1988: 217). In the absence of some event such as the drafting of the NESC re-
port, there is no reason to believe employers would have changed their views about the 
ability of unions to deliver wage restraint in a centralized forum. It is very likely that the 
Fianna Fail government would have negotiated a public sector pay deal with the unions, 
but that private sector employers would have opted for their own decentralized firm-
level negotiations. The question of the impact of such an outcome on the subsequent 
performance of the Irish economy is not easy to estimate. The limited point made here is 
that, without a shared understanding of the potential gains from coordination, organ-
ized employers would never have made this choice, and Ireland could not have moved 
to the centralized pay bargaining system that it retains up to the date of this writing. 
 
 
Italy 
 
  The keystone institution of Italian wage setting during the 1980s was the scala 
mobile—the wage escalator—which automatically tied wage increases to increases in in-
flation. Employers disliked the scala mobile because it imposed wage increases they 
claimed rendered them uncompetitive; unions claimed that any other arrangement 
would gravely weaken the purchasing power of workers (Mania and Orioli 1993: 13-35; 
Locke 1995). With the Italian entry into the narrow bands of the European Monetary 
System, companies lost the capacity to use devaluation to compensate for high wage in-
creases, thus increasing the relative costs of the system for them. In June 1989, the peak 
association of Italian employers (Confindustria) publicly signaled to unions and govern-10 
ment official its intent to abandon the scala mobile.7 This was the credible signal of change 
that began serious discussions among the three concerned collective actors in Italy: em-
ployers, unions, and the government. The decisive agreement on the permanent end of 
the scala mobile was signed in July 1992;. that agreement included a one-year freeze in 
salaries and a moratorium on firm-level bargaining. One year later, an agreement signed 
on July 3 by employers and unions officially established a new system of wage setting 
institutions, in which national wage bargaining was strengthened and new forms of 
workplace representation and bargaining at the firm level were adopted. The move to 
institutions of coordinated wage bargaining was built on the common understandings 
forged between employers and unions in 1991 and 1992 and ratified in the July 1992 
social pact. 
 
 
Common Knowledge Formation and the Abolition of the Scala Mobile 
 
  Italian unions and employers both were capable of vetoing any institutional solu-
tion to replace the scala mobile, and each sought different guarantees from a new institu-
tion: employers wanted to restrain inflation, while union leaders wanted to preserve the 
real incomes of their members. Given the new constraints imposed by the loss of ex-
change rate flexibility, each partner recognized that inflation was detrimental to com-
petitiveness, but each wanted to be sure that its own restraint was not exploited by the 
others. This led to respective initial institutional preferences quite different from those 
initially observed in Ireland. While Italian employers in the internationally traded sec-
tors had pushed for the decentralization of wage bargaining during the 1980s, they dis-
covered that the internationally sheltered sectors dictated the rate of inflation (Perez 
2000: 451). As a result, the peak organization of Italian employers (Confindustria) sought 
to replace the scala mobile with national sectoral bargaining and to eliminate firm-level 
bargaining. Unions also accepted the ability of institutions of coordinated wage bargain-
ing to deliver wage restraint, so they wanted to ensure some that some measure would 
allow them to hedge against the loss of real wages if the rate of inflation exceeded pay 
agreements (Locke and Baccaro 1996). From the perspective of employers, moving to co-
ordinated institutions required a new norm of bargaining that would break the auto-
matic link between past inflation and future pay demands from unions. For unions—
above all the CGIL, the largest, most important Italian union—the problem was to ensure 
that local bargaining units retained some bargaining autonomy.8  
 
  How were they to create a set of negotiating arrangements that responded to the 
concerns of both employers and unions? This required them to devise a jointly agreed 
norm for bargaining. The large cognitive movement between 1989 and the agreement of 
1992 was the emergence of the government’s inflation forecast—never previously con-
sidered credible—as the new basis of bargaining. In other words, this coordinating idea 
                                                 
7 The scala mobile was formally renewed by periodic agreement between employers associations 
and unions; thus, one actor could (in theory) fail to renew it at any time. 
8 It may seem ironic that employers, not unions, were the ones who opposed decentralized bar-
gaining. Yet small firms in Italy (as in Australia) worried that the adoption of plant-level agree-
ments as the primary level of bargaining would be an impetus to unionization of their work-
forces, while unions wanted to use plant-level bargaining to achieve gains over the national 
agreement (Cipolletta 2002; Locke and Baccaro 1996; Mania and Orioli 1993). 11 
became so conspicuous that no other point of agreement was a credible replacement. To 
track the evolution of the expressed views of union leaders, I relied on a search using the 
leading Italian newspapers between 1989 and 1993.9 Between the disavowal of the scala 
mobile in June, 1989, and March 1992, the expressed views of the CGIL leadership on the 
issue of the wage bargaining system appeared remarkably stable: while the role of auto-
matic indexation could be reduced, it could not eliminated and replaced by a bargaining 
system that lacked automatic adjustment. Sergio Cofferati re-stated the union’s official 
position in February 1992: “the defense of wages through a contractual system deprived 
of automatic adjustment [for inflation] is not credible” because “the difficulties of fore-
casting [inflation] are so great as not to be manageable” (ANSA 1992a). 
 
  Between April and June 1992 the three union confederations attempted to forge a 
united front for negotiations with Confindustria. The CGIL changed its position on auto-
matism, foregoing claims to post-hoc reimbursement of the difference between forecast 
and real inflation, but insisting that that new wages automatically adjust to the real infla-
tion figure (ANSA 1992b). Entering into tripartite negotiations, though, the CGIL leader-
ship tried to cast fundamental doubts about the credibility of the using the government’s 
forecast rate of inflation as a basis of negotiation: “Forecast by whom? The employers 
propose a block on any sort of collective bargaining until 1996, with a centralized system 
referring uniquely to the ‘desired’ level of inflation, and it is not clear if it is desired by 
the government or by Confindustria. And without a word on the methods or sanctions 
that would effectively ensure the attainment of these objectives, without a word on the 
behavior of the firms” (Repubblica 1992). The next day, the CGIL leadership asserted in 
the Corriere that actual inflation in 1992 appeared to be considerably higher than that 
forecast by the government. 
 
  Trentin’s protestations notwithstanding, it is already clear that by June 1992 the 
government’s inflation forecast was becoming a prominent point around which negotia-
tions could coalesce. The obviousness of this point as a way to solve the problems of the 
scala mobile, though, only appears in retrospect. In 1990, hardly anyone was talking 
about the government’s inflation forecast in the context of the wage bargaining discus-
sion. The two figures below demonstrate the rise of the government’s inflation forecast 
as a coordinating idea. They document six month intervals from 1989 to the conclusion 
of the agreement on July 30, 1992 abolishing the scala mobile. Figure 1 uses data on ar-
ticles from La Repubblica, while figure 2 uses data on articles from ANSA, the official Ital-
ian press agency. Both show the explosive growth of citations to the government’s infla-
tion forecast, whether in conjunction with mentions of the CGIL (dotted line) or with the 
scala mobile (dashed line). The solid line on the bottom shows all references to the scala 
mobile. 
 
                                                 
9 Sources used in this search were ANSA (the Italian press agency) and the newspapers La Repub-
blica, Il Corriere della Sera, l’Unità, La Stampa, Il Manifesto (the paper closest to the CGIL union lead-
ership) and Il Sole 24 Ore (the paper owned by Confindustria). ANSA, Repubblica, and Corriere, 
which were easily electronically searchable, were the sources used most heavily to track changes 
in opinion over time (using standard search terms). I am grateful to Vikram Siddarth for his assis-
tance in this research. 12 
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Note: This figure and the one on the following page show six-month periods from the beginning of 1989 
to the signing of the agreement in July 1992, that disbanded the scala mobile. Italian labor relations tend to 
have concentrated bursts of negotiation at two times during the year: June and July, and December. The 
six-month periodization in these two figures therefore groups June and July together.  
The figures measure growth in press citations of the following terms: “scala mobile”; “scala mobile” and 
“inflazione programmata” (forecast inflation); and “CGIL” and “inflazione programmata.” The vertical 
axis shows the proportion of citations of a search term in the given time period compared with the 
median number of citations of that search term over the entire time period. In Repubblica, 808 articles over 
this time mentioned at least one of the search terms; in ANSA, 1,638 articles mentioned one of the search 
terms. The correlation between the frequency of citations in the two independent sources was, respec-
tively, .97, .99, and .85. 
 
  Prior to the summer of 1991, the government’s inflation forecast was simply not 
credible, as suggested by one journalist’s question to Labor Minister Franco Marini in 
1991 in an interview about the scala mobile debate: “How can one believe that the forecast 
inflation rates will be respected rigorously, when the government was the first to break 
through the upper limit when it renewed the last contract with public employees?” 
(Repubblica 1991a). What happened between 1991 and 1992, and what ultimately made 
the agreement of July 1992 possible, was the emergence of the government’s inflation 
forecast as a credible indicator for bargaining, shared by Confindustria and the three 
leading union confederations. Marini—himself a former union leader at the CISL—made 
the government’s inflation forecast the center of his proposals for institutional reform, 
although his program was ultimately not successful (Repubblica 1991b). In September, 
1991, the leader of the CGIL still flatly rejected the inflation forecasts of the government 
as non-credible (Repubblica 1991c). By the end of November 1991, though, the three 
union leaders held a joint press conference making the “updating” (raising) of the gov-
ernment’s inflation forecast a central plank of their public appeal (ANSA 1991). By this 13 
time, clearly, union leaders were anticipating that this government figure would likely 
play a central role in whatever institutional solution was adopted; why else would they 
appeal to raise an inflation forecast in a joint press conference? 
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 The  CGIL resisted the emergence of this coordinating idea because forecast infla-
tion often fails to under-predict real inflation; as such, it was a point that employers 
would be more likely to favor as the starting point for negotiations. Yet by the summer 
of 1992, the course of discussions between employers and unions had left no real alter-
native to the government’s inflation forecast. If its credibility could be established, then 
it would be difficult for the CGIL leadership not to sign an agreement. This process 
played out in a very public way in the Italian press in June and July, and it provides a 
rare glimpse of a “factually resolvable” argument that was key to a political accord.10 In 
the absence of a new wage agreement, 1992 wages had been determined without the 
scala mobile. Thus, if the 1992 wages were to be equal to or higher than forecast infla-
tion—the new coordinating idea for the wage bargainers—this would have provided 
strong evidence to the claim that sectoral bargaining, without any sort of automatic ad-
justment, was sufficient to maintain the purchasing power of workers. This was a claim 
that the president of Confindustria, Luigi Abete, began pursuing publicly in early June:  
“the gross median salary in the manufacturing sector in 1992 has risen by more than 5 
percent without the scala mobile. Forecast inflation is 4.5 percent. It is not therefore true 
                                                 
10 A fact is only a fact if actors jointly agree that it is a point of disagreement subject to empirical 
resolution and not a point of divergent perceptions. 14 
that the manufacturing worker loses out with respect to forecast inflation if he does not 
have the scala mobile.” (Corriere 1992a) This factual disagreement became a turning point 
in the final negotiations, when Abete repeated his claims about the growth of wages 
without the scala mobile, while union leaders argued that they had different figures, say-
ing “it depends how you calculate it. Let’s ask for a third body to decide on the figures: 
the Bank of Italy” (Corriere 1992b). 
 
  What is crucial here is that unions were unwilling to sign the accord before a 
technical group (bank economists), accepted by both sides, came up with a diagnosis 
that was jointly accepted. In their analysis, the bank’s economists confirmed Confindus-
tria’s claims that gross compensation would exceed the forecast rate of inflation in 1992, 
even without the scala mobile (Corriere 1992c). This joint analysis of the problem—and 
the acceptance of the view that the scala mobile was incompatible with stability of the lira 
in the EMS and its abandonment would not hurt purchasing power significantly—was 
the turning point of the negotiations and the basis for the prime minister’s final proposal 
(Cipolletta 2002). Prime Minister Amato’s draft enshrined the objective of protecting the 
purchasing power of real salaries in the accord that entombed the scala mobile, and it was 
signed by all parties on July 31 (Mania and Orioli 1993: 166). The clear emergence of the 
government’s inflation estimate as a coordinating idea, followed by the agreement of all 
parties to submit the technical question to an honest broker, determined the outcome of 
the negotiations. It became implausible for union leaders to negotiate in good faith to a 
different outcome.  
 
  Clearly, the leadership of the CGIL preferred some sort of coordinated bargaining 
outcome to no agreement at all (Unità 1992). Their potential gain from coordination lay 
not only in the fear that no agreement would topple the government,11 but also because 
union confederations stood to gain by increasing their leverage (over more radical shop-
floor competitors) by involvement in a limited number of bargaining arrangements 
(Perez 2000: 452). Yet, over the course of negotiations with employers, they had proven 
unable to articulate a credible alternative system of coordination based around a norm 
of bargaining other than that of forecast inflation. While union leaders clearly were not 
happy with the accord of 1992, their self-criticisms after the fact are illuminating. The 
criticism concerned the strategy of general framing of problems, as noted by a member 
of national directorate of the CGIL several days after the 1992 accord: “A union that falls 
into a trap should ask itself why we fell in. And the error was not committed in the last 
three days [before signing] but in the last ten years lost in defending at all costs the scala 
mobile without being capable of proposing alternatives” (Manifesto 1992). This observa-
tion is acutely accurate. The CGIL leadership failed to generate alternative proposals, and 
so left space for the experimental role of bargaining based on forecast inflation to be-
come the only credible idea. Unions signed the deal because the process of change had 
unfolded in a way that made it the only plausible alternative. They had come to agree 
with employers that their were gains from coordination, but their lateness in coming to 
                                                 
11 The nonpartisan government that brokered the accord—often labeled a paragon of state in-
volvement in new “competitive corporatist” pacts (Rhodes 1998)—was indeed deeply involved. 
But its strength was as an honest broker rather than of coercion, since it was a non-elected techno-
cratic government. 15 
this view prevented them from articulating an alternative norm around which coordi-
nated bargaining could coalesce. 
 
 
Employer Preferences and Institutional Change: the 1993 Accord  
 
  The 1992 agreement was by almost any measure a victory for Confindustria, 
which finally succeeded in burying the scala mobile. The agreement shifted the terms of 
wage bargaining discourse from a norm of automatic adjustment (through the wage es-
calator) to one of bargaining between employers and unions on the basis of the forecast 
inflation rate. It thus established the expectations of employers about the framework 
within which unions would pose their future wage bargaining demands. The 1992 
agreement only abolished the old institution; it did not establish new wage bargaining 
institutions. What remained in the way of shifting to new institutions was the issue of 
firm-level bargaining. Unions, which had been challenged throughout the 1980s by more 
radical plant-level union rivals, wanted an agreement that reinforced their plant-level 
organization while leaving maximal scope for firm-level bargaining as a means to pro-
tect the real incomes of workers (Locke and Baccaro 1996). Much of the negative re-
sponse by union leaders to the 1992 accord that had abolished the scala mobile was the 
one-year freeze on firm-level bargaining that it entailed, and this was a subject of acri-
monious negotiations in the fall of 1992 and the spring of 1993. 
 
  Employers initially opposed firm-level bargaining for two reasons. First, they 
viewed a single national (sectoral) agreement as the best way to control labor costs 
(Perez 2000). Establishing two different levels of negotiation would leave open the possi-
bility that firm-level agreements could undermine the restraint agreed at the national 
level. Employers refused to budge from their opposition to firm-level bargaining in the 
1992 agreement for exactly this reason. Second, small firms were ill-equipped for firm-
level bargaining, and they wanted to ensure that any agreement that applied to large 
firms did not force them into bargaining with unions (and thus spur unionization of 
their workforces). Any agreement on firm-level bargaining required that organized em-
ployers accept the proposition that a contractual role for firm-level bargaining would 
not undo the cost-containment of national agreements nor impose firm bargaining on 
small companies.  
 
  Yet the 1992 agreement had ratified common expectations among the national 
unions and employers about the norms of wage-setting. This common expectation cre-
ated the possibility for a compromise on firm-level bargaining. Confindustria leaders 
were willing to believe that the major national unions would not use the existence of 
firm-level bargaining to undermine national agreements, because they had signed the 
1992 accord.12 However, while organized employers had changed their expectations of 
bargainers from the national union confederations, these expectations did not apply to 
unaffiliated labor militants. During the 1980s, the national union federations had been 
challenged at the firm level by independent “grassroots committees” (COBAS) and au-
                                                 
12 In the words of Innocenzo Cipolletta, the director general of Confindustria from 1990, “To have 
a national level agreement, it was important to unite unions, and to make the negotiated agree-
ment stick to workers across the country” (interview with the author, 18 July 2003). 
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tonomous union groups. These groups were uninvolved in the national agreement and 
unlikely to have accepted its bargaining rationale. In the 1993 agreement, Confindustria 
acceded to the establishment of new institutions of workplace representation—the RSU 
(Rappresentanze Sindacali Unitarie)—which unions had demanded. Yet the employers’ 
confederation insisted that these local bargaining units have strong appointed represen-
tation from those unions that had signed the national agreement, thus linking firm-level 
bargaining to groups that had signaled their agreement with the new pay norm (Locke 
and Baccaro 1996: 299; Cipolletta 2002). 
 
  With this institutional feature, organized employers led by large firms were will-
ing to recognize the official status of two levels of negotiation: national (sectoral) and 
local.13 Small firms, though, desperately sought to avoid being forced into firm-level bar-
gaining. The representatives of small firms particularly feared firm-level bargaining both 
for its ability to generate discord and because they lacked the resources to deal with 
unions that large firms possessed. This was a difficult problem to resolve through con-
tractual language: employers were willing to accede to some bargaining, but not every 
employer was to be forced to bargain. The final language of the accord on this issue is 
ambiguous, specifying that firm-level bargaining would only occur “in the spirit of cur-
rent bargaining practices, particularly with regard to small firms” (Mania and Orioli 
1993: 53). What does “the spirit of current practices” mean, though? The key clarification 
on this point was made not by the unions, but by Labor Minister Gino Giugni, in a 
newspaper editorial released the day before the agreement was signed: “Nobody wants 
to make firm-level bargaining obligatory. Everything must remain as before: [social part-
ners] negotiate where they want to negotiate, where there are the resources and also the 
know-how for a negotiation.”14 Note that this was not an undertaking from the unions to 
the employers, but instead an explicitly interpretative text by a third party laying out a 
joint understanding of an ambiguous text that all actors recognized as unclear and ex-
perimental (Sole 24 Ore 1993). Game theorists call such unenforceable language cheap 
talk. What this amounts to is the Labor Minister’s saying, “we only make this agreement 
if unions and employers believe that the other believes that existing local negotiating 
patterns will continue, and firm-level bargaining will be respected in large firms but not 
forced on small firms.” Each party had conceded something, but the signing only hap-
pened when a non-binding newspaper editorial created a shared frame for understand-
ing future joint expectations.  
 
  The July 1993 agreement that recast the institutions of Italian wage bargaining 
was consummated not so much by explicit concessions as by the establishment of shared 
set of beliefs about how a sometimes vague text would be interpreted. Prior to the agree-
                                                 
13 The local agreements could be either firm- or plant-level (typically in large industrial groups) 
or territorial (in the building industry or commerce). 
14 Quoted in Mania and Orioli (1993: 33-34). Carlo Callieri, the vice president of Confindustria in 
charge of union relations at the time of the accord, noted of the newspaper editorial, “The prob-
lem of firm-level negotiation in the small companies has always existed, and from the beginning 
we underlined it forcefully. The unions, if anything, underestimated this, and they were forced at 
the end to recognize that this was an insurmountable problem; the Labor Minister did well to 
eliminate any equivocation when he confirmed the optional nature of the second contractual 
level” (ibid: 149). 17 
ment of 1992, such an outcome would have been inconceivable. Confindustria leaders 
were only willing to concede firm-level bargaining with national unions because of the 
recognition of the new pay norms in 1992. Without the agreement on firm-level bargain-
ing, the national unions would never have agreed to the terms of the compromise of 
1993. This arrangement would have retained a functionally decentralized system, in 
which firm level bargains varied widely. As summarized by the director general of Con-
findustria, the move to coordinated institutions in 1993 was built on a compromise: “the 
union renounced its claims to the formula of guaranteeing purchasing power, while ob-
taining the agreement that contract renewals would take into account previous losses of 
purchasing power; and we accepted the two levels of bargaining, while obtaining many 
clarifications on their not overlapping” (Cipolletta 2002: 10). Such a trade only became 
possible when employers believed that unions saw a gain in moving to nationally co-
ordinated institutions. 
 
 
Australia 
 
  The Australian case vividly demonstrates that governments have difficulty legis-
lating a move to a stably coordinated equilibrium without the active cooperation of so-
cial partners. The Australian government imposed a centralized wage-setting system in 
1983, following a wage explosion under decentralized institutions during the previous 
two years (Briggs 2000: 7). This extreme centralization, never favored by employers’ as-
sociations, quickly gave way to coordinated industry bargaining, in which national 
agreements were formally supplemented by firm-level agreements based on productiv-
ity increases, a formula similar to those adopted in Italy and Ireland (Wooden and Sloan 
1998: 176-8). This compromise agreement, reached in 1987, was led by employers and 
unions in the metal-working sector, and resulted from their “shared commitment to 
raising the metal industry’s productivity, performance and prospects, and a mutual un-
derstanding of the compromises involved for each” (Sheldon and Thornthwaite 1999: 
78-9). This understanding unraveled between 1992 and 1993, as the metal-workers’ 
union rejected the commitment to productivity as the agreed basis of wage bargaining 
increases (Boland 1993: 8-9). The change by the unions triggered a reconsideration by 
metal employers of their position on wage bargaining and led them to join other em-
ployers in pushing to more decentralized (enterprise-level) bargaining from 1993 on-
wards. This moment proved to be decisive for future development, as since then “Aus-
tralian industrial relations have traveled further and further down the path mapped out 
by ‘free-market deregulationists’” (Briggs 2001: 27). The divergence of the metal-workers 
and employers was not inevitable, but once it happened it was part of a movement of 
Australian institutions to firm-level bargaining that became irreversible. 
 
 
The Cognitive Divergence of Metal Employers and Workers 
 
  As in many advanced industrial countries, the organizations of the metal and en-
gineering sector have played a leading role in industrial relations institutions in Austra-
lia. This was particularly true during the late 1980s, when the sectoral employers’ associ-
ation (MTIA) and union (AMWU) “provided much of the intellectual drive and strategic 
initiative for reforms” to the industrial relations system, as the system incorporated 
some elements of firm-level bargaining within a nationally agreed bargaining frame-18 
work (Sheldon and Thornthwaite 1999: 70).15 Up until 1993, the MTIA vigorously 
opposed a move to decentralized bargaining, fearing both inflationary effects and in-
creased industrial unrest at member companies (Boland 1992). The AMWU, faced with 
high job losses in the sector in the early 1980s, came to an accord with the employers of 
the MTIA, linking reforms to bargaining and to vocational training in the sector, which 
both groups perceived as a weakness. “[I]t was the growing perception among unionists 
and employers of a shared interest in the industry’s future that inspired their collabo-
ration in the quest to improve the industry’s prospects, a collaboration that proved both 
strong and effective until the early 1990s, when the parties split over the desired shape 
of enterprise bargaining” (Sheldon and Thornthwaite 1999: 75-6). This divergence over 
institutional preferences was in no sense inevitable. It resulted from the perception on 
the part of employers that the AMWU changed its view of the role of productivity in bar-
gaining. Once this change in perception happened, the internal conflict within MTIA on 
this issue ceased, and it reversed course and advocated firm-level bargaining. 
 
  The adoption of centralized bargaining in Australia in 1983 had been led by the 
newly elected Labor government and the trade union federations, not by employers. 
Among employer groups, the MTIA was the most favorable to centralized institutions, 
though it preferred national, sectoral negotiations (as in Italy) to cross-sectoral negotia-
tions (as in Ireland). The MTIA leadership, worried about international competitiveness, 
increasingly linked its concerns with adding some wage flexibility (at the firm level) to 
the bargaining system to reforms of the baroque system of workplace training.16  In this 
its agenda converged with that of the AMWU, which was increasingly interested in using 
its industrial relations muscle to influence government economic policies in a range of 
fields and was willing to commit to national bargaining in order to achieve that objective 
(Briggs 2002: 24). As part of their drive to improve the policy supports of the metal in-
dustry, in 1987 the metal employers and union jointly submitted a reform proposal to 
the Australian Council for Employment and Training, which led the federal government 
to introduce a three-year project investigating reforms in the industry (Sheldon and 
Thornthwaite 1999: 79). This joint effort on the reforms of the training system was cer-
tainly part of the reason the MTIA continued to support centralized bargaining, in the 
belief that centralized bargaining could provide the most transparent links between 
wage and skill levels. The MTIA’s official publication asserted as late as 1990 that the 
“[The question of training] transcends the question of what sort of an industrial system 
Australia should have. Centralized, decentralized, or partly decentralized, none of these 
                                                 
15 The AMWU (Amalgamated Metalworkers Union) has gone through a series of mergers with 
other unions in related industries. It was called the AMWU from 1985-1991, and that name is used 
to refer to it throughout this paper. After a series of amalgamations and name changes in the 
early 1990s, the AMWU kept its historic acronym, which now designated Australian Manufac-
turing Workers Union.  
16 “At the beginning of this period, training and skills formation in the industry consisted of eight 
autonomous and different state and territory systems; over 36 craft and 300 non-craft skill cate-
gories; narrow occupational categories related to technology and product rather than competen-
cy; technical rather than generic skills acquisition; and an inability to tailor training programmes 
to suit the needs of particular firms and sectors” (Sheldon and Thornthwaite 1999: 78-9). 
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can deliver the high productivity our economy needs if our system of training is stuck in 
the 1940s and 1950s” (ibid: 80-1). 
 
  The position of the MTIA in favor of retaining centralized wage-setting was a 
product not only of its priority for vocational training reform, but also of the voice of 
small and medium-sized member companies, which (as in Italy) deeply feared firm-level 
bargaining. These companies particularly feared wholesale industrial action if bargain-
ing reverted to the firm level, and that they would be least well-placed to negotiate with 
unions in such conditions (Boland 1993). Large firms, better equipped to deal with direct 
bargaining with their unions, were more likely to share the message of radical decen-
tralization pushed by the Business Council of Australia (BCA), an employer group whose 
influence had risen sharply since the mid-1980s (Matthews 1994). The key to holding to-
gether the coalition of large and small firms in the MTIA behind coordinated wage bar-
gaining lay ultimately in the ability to deliver wage restraint. As late as 1991, the asso-
ciation publicly argued that centralized negotiation was more productive than decentral-
ized industrial conflict: “the deregulationists are fooling themselves if they believe that 
you can achieve rapid change by throwing the entire responsibility back to individual 
enterprises and in the process deliberately provoke a confrontation with the unions” 
(MTIA 1991, cited in Sheldon and Thornthwaite 1999: 83). 
 
  Yet the support of the MTIA depended also, and fundamentally, on the willing-
ness of unions not to push wage drift at the plant level. So long as the AMWU was willing 
to trade away its firm-level wage bargaining power for influence over policy goals, this 
was a coalition that could hang together. Starting in 1989, however, wage pressures be-
gan to intensify within the skilled workers within the AMWU. As summarized by the na-
tional leader of the metal-workers’ federation: “What I could see happening for us … 
was tradespeople, the metalworkers base membership, breaking with the union … we 
had to let steam out of the kettle or else it would have blown up. That’s why we moved 
back to enterprise bargaining” (cited in Briggs 2001: 34).  The dynamic of skilled workers 
pushing against centralized bargaining is familiar from Iversen’s work (1996) on Den-
mark and Sweden. Yet this was no cross-class coalition of employer and unions in the 
skilled sectors, of the sort observed by Pontusson and Swenson (2000). The organized 
metal employers were trying to hold the system together, as noted above. The intensi-
fication of the wage demands of the AMWU were followed by two successive wage cam-
paigns (1990-91 and 1991-92) in which the union renounced its previous strategy and 
refused to link its steep wage demands to productivity trade-offs.  
 
  The formal breakdown of centralized wage bargaining in Australia took place on 
the initiative of the trade union federation (ACTU), led by the metal workers, against the 
wishes of both the MTIA and the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC), the 
labor court. Other employer federations had joined the ACTU in lobbying for enterprise 
bargaining, but in April 1991 the AIRC handed down a binding decision rejecting appeals 
for firm-bargaining and siding with the MTIA’s argument about the dangers of a 
decentralization-led wage explosion (Briggs 2001: 36). The ACTU rejected the ruling, 
though; its leader, Bill Kelty, decried the ruling as ‘vomit’ (Matthews 199x: 159).  The 
ACTU began its own wage campaign based on decentralization, with the support of em-
ployer groups that did favor firm-level bargaining. Faced with this rejection by the social 20 
partners, the AIRC was forced to reverse its ruling in October 1991, thus formally moving 
Australia toward a system of firm-level bargaining.  
 
  The change of formal rules through the AIRC ruling divided employers’ associa-
tions, with the MTIA standing alone in favor of using its own agreement with the metal 
union as the basis for other agreements, rather than moving to fully decentralized bar-
gaining. According to the head of industrial relations at the MTIA during this time, “In 
implementing the [AIRC’s] enterprise bargaining principle, MTIA took the view that an 
agreed agenda with the unions at the industry level for enterprise bargaining was more 
likely to achieve genuine workplace reform because of union commitment to the agenda than 
one where there were no guidelines” (Boland 1992: 14; emphasis added). This industry 
negotiated framework in the metal sector—sectorally coordinated bargaining by any 
other name—served as the basis for a majority of the firm-level agreements registered 
with the industrial relations commission between October 1991 and December 1992. In 
the first year of formally regulated enterprise bargaining, the MTIA thus successfully 
used its sectoral agreement to provide a set of parameters for firm-level bargaining, thus 
limiting the extent to which Australian wage bargaining was in fact decentralized in 
1992. 
 
 However,  the  AMWU wage campaigns eroded the prevailing belief among the 
member firms of the MTIA that wage centralization could continue to provide real wage 
restraint. Once the MTIA member firms realized that the AMWU no longer shared the 
common view of reforming the industry that they had shared during the 1980s—based 
around the notion of improving productivity to be competitive internationally—the at-
traction of coordinated bargaining institutions faded away as well. The chief negotiator 
for the MTIA, Roger Boland, summarized the view of his organization in an article pub-
lished by the Australian Institute of Management in 1993. It is worth quoting from that 
article at length to view the position of the metal employers: 
 
MTIA saw the industry framework as a transitionary mechanism in 
making the shift to a more deregulated labour market. The framework 
was designed to maintain stable industrial relations; avoid the prospect of 
excessive wage outcomes; achieve genuine workplace reform across a 
broad front—not just an enterprise here and there; and to assist in chang-
ing outdated industrial relations values […].  Accordingly, MTIA was 
looking for a new industry framework to operate from 1 January 1993 in 
order to maintain the momentum of workplace change in a stable indus-
trial relations environment […].  MTIA put to the unions late last year a 
proposal that the parties should agree to a set of guidelines that would as-
sist and encourage further workplace change […].  The metal unions re-
jected MTIA’s proposals, insisting that the only basis upon which an in-
dustry framework could be agreed was an “economic adjustment” of six 
percent over the next two years to apply to all employees in the industry. 
In addition, further wage increases would be payable on the basis of 
“achieved productivity.” [….] Securing economic recovery for Australia 
and at the same time building higher competitiveness for our industries 
must be our top priority. Wage outcomes must reinforce this priority, not 
present more risks. An across the board wage increase which has no 21 
connection with the national imperative of increasing our productivity is 
simply out of the question. […] 
It is obviously a matter of some regret to MTIA that an agreed industry 
framework has not been achievable. […] MTIA would have preferred to 
continue with a managed approach to workplace change, but there are 
too many forces operating against us. […] There is no alternative in Aus-
tralia but to continue the process of workplace change regardless of the 
trade unions’ unwillingness to cooperate. (Boland 1993: 6-11) 
 
  This was the decisive turning point after which the MTIA —the last employer 
group to oppose broader decentralization of wage bargaining institutions—fell into line 
with other employers’ organizations. Its move was dictated not by a long-standing insti-
tutional preference for decentralization, but on a changed view of the beliefs guiding the 
metal sector unions.17 
 
  This development was in no sense inevitable. The skilled worker push for catch-
ing up on the lost real wages of the late 1980s probably was inevitable. Yet that wage 
catch-up did not have to take the institutional form it did, of a straightforward endorse-
ment of company-level bargaining. This strategy was indeed at variance with some of 
the union federation’s own declared interests, as Chris Briggs notes (2001: 39): “The ear-
ly 1990s represent a missed opportunity for the union movement… [A]t a moment when 
wage-fixing institutions were being restructured, the political influence of the ACTU via 
the Accord and capacity to organize industrial mobilizations delivered the union move-
ment an opportunity to achieve institutional changes to facilitate adaptation to a more 
decentralized environment…. Instead, the ACTU chose the ‘company-by-company’ 
model rejected by the ACTU ‘blueprint’ just months earlier.” In pursuing such a strategy, 
the unions not only undermined their direct influence, but changed the perceptions of 
the employers’ organization that had most supported centralized bargaining. Once 
metal unions were seen by metal employers to have abandoned the notion of 
productivity-based bargaining, their institutional preferences changed. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
  What ultimately distinguished metal employers in Australia from their Italian 
and Irish counterparts was their beliefs about trade union leaders and how they saw the 
world. In the latter cases, these beliefs changed over time as a result of their ongoing 
interaction with (and the actions of) trade union leaders. In both Ireland and Italy, em-
ployers and unions came to agree on a coordinating idea that could underpin their be-
liefs in the value of coordination. These ideas were not instrumentally deployed by em-
ployers as a means to convince unions to change their minds. In both cases, they 
emerged out of a process of interaction and joint experience. At a key juncture, these 
ideas were “ratified” by both sides in what I call common-knowledge events. These 
events led organized employers, subsequently, to make important changes in their pre-
vious position about acceptable institutions of wage bargaining. This change made pos-
                                                 
17 The tone of this document could not be more different from that adopted by Boland eighteen 
months earlier, when he gave a talk on behalf of the MTIA entitled “The Need to Maintain a 
Centralised Wage-Fixing System” (Boland 1991). 22 
sible the move to institutionalize coordinated wage bargaining in both countries. As I 
have argued through counterfactual analysis in this paper, without such a move these 
countries would not have moved to the forms of coordinated bargaining they eventually 
adopted and still maintain today. 
  
Table 1: Employer Preferences, Common Knowledge Events,  
and Institutional Change 
 
  Coordinating 
Idea (potential) 
Event Employer  Change  Institutional 
Change 
Ireland  Small, open 
economy 
NESC report 
Nov. 1986 
Accept Centralized 
Bargaining 
October 1987 
Italy  Forecast Inflation  Tripartite Pact 
July 1992 
Allow Firm-Level 
Role in Sectoral 
Bargaining 
July 1993 
Australia  Productivity 
(small, open 
economy) 
None [MTIA: move to 
decentralized 
bargaining] 
October 1991 
[Jan 1993— 
MTIA] 
 
  In Australia, where metal employers and unions never did ratify the coordinat-
ing idea of improving productivity as a small open economy, metal employers in 1993 
moved away from their embrace of coordinated bargaining, never to return. To be sure, 
there were other forces in Australia—notably some large non-metal firms but also some 
skilled workers—who pushed aggressively for the move to firm-level bargaining in Aus-
tralia. As a leading player in the industrial relations arena, however, I have argued that 
the MTIA was in a position to brake or indeed reverse the move to decentralization, had 
its leadership shared a common view with the leaders of the metal unions as to the de-
sirability of some form of coordinated wage bargaining. That shared idea was never 
jointly agreed by metal unions, and in its absence the MTIA leadership joined the leaders 
of other employer groups in Australia in moving toward decentralization. 
 
  During potential moves to more coordinated institutions, competing actors have 
some idea of what institutional solutions they prefer. The process of negotiating over the 
nature of shared problems can, however, generate points of agreement that elevate pre-
viously unconsidered or discarded institutional solutions to the status of the “obvious” 
alternative. In the Irish case, for example, Irish employers bargained from a position of 
great strength, as high unemployment and emigration that had seriously weakened Irish 
unions during the first half of the 1980s. Yet these strong employers suddenly accepted 
in 1987 the centralized bargaining institutions that the unions had advocated for more 
than a year. The employers accepted this change not because they were weak, but be-
cause their shared analysis of Ireland as a small open economy led them increasingly to 
the view that controlling private sector wages meant controlling public sector wages, 
and that both could ends could best be secured through a centralized negotiating for-
mat. They also, and fundamentally, had changed their view of how union leaders would 
respond to centrally bargained wages. Irish employers, in retrospect, clearly got a good 
deal from the centralized bargaining arrangements of 1987, and from those that followed 
(Baccaro and Simoni 2004). This was not at all clear at the time of agreement, though, 
and publications close to the employers made scathing criticisms of the agreement at the 23 
time (Business and Finance 1987b). Organized employers signed the pay deal not because 
they knew it was a good deal, but because the course of discussions and diagnoses of the 
problems of the Irish economy had left them with no plausible alternative institutional 
arrangement. 
 
  This paper has focused on changes at the leadership level, which is where agree-
ments in industrial relations are generally struck. The questions of how the views of the 
leadership are debated and become common knowledge across membership organiza-
tions is one that has been examined closely in the case of unions by Baccaro (2002a and 
b). How such shifts in belief are debated and legitimated in employers’ associations is 
something we know little about (cf. C. Martin 2000 for a study of American employers). 
Given the centrality of employers to the cases of institutional change studied here, and 
the general trend in comparative political economy toward closer analytical attention to 
the interests of employers, this could be a productive frontier for future research.  
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